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Abstract There have been periodic claims that evolutionary biology needs urgent
reform, and this article tries to account for the volume and persistence of this
discontent. It is argued that a few inescapable properties of the field make it prone to
criticisms of predictable kinds, whether or not the criticisms have any merit. For
example, the variety of living things and the complexity of evolution make it easy to
generate data that seem revolutionary (e.g. exceptions to well-established general-
izations, or neglected factors in evolution), and lead to disappointment with existing
explanatory frameworks (with their high levels of abstraction, and limited predictive
power). It is then argued that special discontent stems from misunderstandings and
dislike of one well-known but atypical research programme: the study of adaptive
function, in the tradition of behavioural ecology. To achieve its goals, this research
needs distinct tools, often including imaginary agency, and a partial description of
the evolutionary process. This invites mistaken charges of narrowness and over-
simplification (which come, not least, from researchers in other subfields), and these
chime with anxieties about human agency and overall purpose. The article ends by
discussing several ways in which calls to reform evolutionary biology actively
hinder progress in the field.
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Discontent and laundry lists
A dispiriting thing about working in evolutionary biology is the steady stream of
claims that the field needs urgent reform. These critiques are too numerous to cite,
but representatives include Waddington (1957), Moorhead and Kaplan (1966), Ho
and Saunders (1984), Gould (1980, 2002), Pigliucci and Mu¨ller (2010), and Laland
et al. (2014).
These critiques differ greatly from one another; indeed, their conclusions range
from the undeniable (‘‘new concepts and empirical findings […] may eventually
force a shift of emphasis’’; Pigliucci 2007), to the more robust (‘‘It’s wrong like
phrenology is wrong. Every major tenet of it is wrong’’; Lynn Margulis quoted in
Kelly 1994, p. 470). Nevertheless, there are some good reasons for considering the
discontent as a whole.
First, some of the critics themselves recognise a shared enterprise, with
conferences or multi-authored volumes united solely by the participants’ discontent
with current practice. The result is often ‘‘laundry lists’’ of ideas or observations
which the field is urged to incorporate or emphasise, but which have little or nothing
in common with each other.1 The only certainty is that something needs to change
(Pigliucci 2007; Chorost 2013; Pennisi 2016).
Second, irrespective of the content of the individual critiques, the sheer volume
and persistence of the discontent must be telling us something important about
evolutionary biology. Broadly speaking, there are two possibilities, both dispiriting.
Either (1) the field is seriously deficient, but it shows a peculiar conservatism and
failure to embrace ideas that are new, true and very important; or (2) something
about evolutionary biology makes it prone to the championing of ideas that are new
but false or unimportant, or true and important, but already well studied under a
different branding.
This article will argue for possibility (2). It will suggest that a few distinct and
inescapable properties of evolutionary biology make the field highly likely to attract
discontent, regardless of whether the criticisms have any merit.
The aims of the article are therefore limited in two major ways. First, to explain
the volume of the discontent, critiques will be painted with a broad brush, to bring
out some common features. This is not a substitute for engaging properly with any
individual argument. Second, the article will ignore factors common to most of us in
most academic subjects, such as self-promotion and the quest for ‘‘impact’’.2 As
Kitcher (2000, p. 30) has argued, all scientific controversies entail the construction
1 E.g., ‘‘evolvability, phenotypic plasticity, epigenetic inheritance, complexity theory, and the theory of
evolution in highly dimensional adaptive landscapes’’ (Pigliucci 2007); ‘‘modularity, hierarchy,
constraints, evolvability, novelty, and emergence, robustness, history, etc.’’ (Laubichler 2009);
‘‘evolvability, developmental plasticity, phenotypic and genetic accommodation, punctuated evolution,
phenotypic innovation, facilitated variation, epigenetic inheritance, and multi-level selection’’ (Pigliucci
and Mu¨ller 2010). Rose (2016a) mentions genetic accommodation, epigenetics, co-operative interactions,
group and ecosystem selection, self-organisation, niche construction, behavioural and symbolic
transmission, and Marxism. See also Chorost (2013) and Maynard Smith (1988), Ch. 18.
2 ‘‘What I tried to say about Steve Gould is that scientists are always looking to find some theory or idea
that they can push as something that nobody else ever thought of because that’s the way they get their
prestige… they have an idea which will overturn our whole view of evolution because otherwise they’re
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of ‘‘career niches’’, but the focus here is on features that are peculiar to evolutionary
biology.
The problems
Some problems for evolutionary biology are caused by the basic characteristics of
life. Living things evolved from one or a few common ancestors, but are now
characterized by their enormous abundance, variety and complexity. Each is the
result of historical processes involving contingencies of distinct kinds (Lenormand
et al. 2009), sometimes including one-off events, which might have been highly
improbable, but which had profound consequences.
Some banal practical problems are caused by the sheer scope of evolutionary
biology. Nobody can hope to read enough of the relevant literature, which means
that ideas rightly rejected in one sub-discipline can be rediscovered, or warmed over
in others (if the Drosophila people aren’t impressed, then you can always try the
clinical virologists, or the vertebrate palaeontologists, or the biological anthropol-
ogists, etc.), and also makes it almost inevitable that key terms will be used in
importantly different ways (as with ‘‘adaptation’’, ‘‘conflict’’, ‘‘environment’’,
‘‘epigenetics’’, ‘‘evolution’’, ‘‘fitness’’, ‘‘gene’’, ‘‘group selection’’, ‘‘heritability’’,
‘‘phenotype’’, ‘‘relatedness’’, ‘‘selfish’’, ‘‘species’’, etc.; Dawkins 1982, 2004;
Maynard Smith 2001; Griffiths and Stotz 2006; West et al. 2007; Haig 2012;
Rousset 2015). By confusing these senses, it is easy to make uncontroversial claims
sound exciting; this may happen most often with the term ‘‘random mutation’’
(Waddington 1957; Bateson 1958; Laland et al. 2011; Martincorena and Luscombe
2012).3
Second, new data appear at a very rapid rate, particularly, in recent years, from
molecular biology. This creates the misleading impression that new conceptual
frameworks must also be required,4 and that valid research programmes are
somehow out of date (leading, e.g. to behavioural ecologists feeling compelled to do
metabolomics). Third, the scope means that authors are drawn to criticize
evolutionary biology when their interests and expertise lie elsewhere. This is often
in some branch of human psychology, and philosophers of very different stripes
Footnote 2 continued
just workers in the factory, so to speak. And the factory was designed by Charles Darwin.’’ (Richard
Lewontin, cited in Mazur 2010, p. 30). See also Eldredge (1995, p. 56).
3 The claim that mutation is undirected (or ‘‘random’’) is perhaps the closest thing to a tenet of
evolutionary biology. It states that a truly novel environment will not preferentially induce mutations that
are appropriate to that environment. This must be distinguished from the claim that the rate and spectrum
of mutations might adaptively evolve (e.g. Kimura 1967), and from the falsism that all mutations are
equally likely to occur. If directed mutation did happen, it would be very important, and very difficult to
explain with current scientific theories; but there are many more published articles about directed
mutation than well-documented instances. Miller (1999) makes an explicit connection to miracles.
4 For example, Pigliucci (2007) argued that ‘‘one would not expect the original synthesis to be able to
address directly the wealth of information emerging from genomics […] and the other new ‘-omics’
sciences’’. But it is doing so (e.g., Lynch 2007). The fact that old frameworks are so often applicable to
novel data follows directly from their high levels of abstraction.
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have been accused of mischaracterizing the whole of evolutionary biology solely to
bolster a theory of semantic content (Wouters 2005; Rosenberg 2013).
The characteristics of life also make it easy—all too easy—to collect data whose
implications seem revolutionary. This is true in two distinct ways. First, all
generalizations in biology, from the colour of swans to the misnamed central dogma
(Crick 1988), have exceptions (Beatty 1995; Rosenberg 2013), and so it will often
be straightforward to make observations that contradict any well-established
generalization. Such observations may be truly novel, without being ‘‘important’’ in
any other sense. Second, it is straightforward to identify factors that have been little
discussed in the biology literature, but which have had a major influence on the
evolutionary outcomes in some lineage or lineages. Off the top of my head, ‘‘red
things’’ are common in many ecosystems, and are little discussed as a class in the
biological literature. However, removing red things, doubling their number, or
changing their colour would change the outcomes of evolution in many cases. In
this sense, it is easy to show that ‘‘Red Things are an important and neglected factor
in evolution’’. Similar arguments could be made for ‘‘gravity’’, ‘‘burrowing’’,
‘‘oxidative damage’’, ‘‘noses’’, ‘‘histone modification’’, etc.
The characteristics of life also guarantee that the explanatory frameworks of
evolutionary biology will be disappointing to some. Disappointment is caused partly
by the sheer complexity of life’s dynamical processes. This means that our
predictive power will always be weak in certain ways, and that our descriptions of
evolution will always be enormous simplifications. This isn’t a counsel of despair:
while all models are wrong, some are useful (Box 1979; Strevens 2008).
Nevertheless, answers to several types of straightforward question must always
be incomplete5 (Mozley 1884, pp. 396–7; Tinbergen 1963; Strevens 2008), and it
will always be easy for critics to claim—correctly—that ‘‘things are more
complicated’’, particularly if they don’t specify their own explanatory goals.
Disappointment also stems from the variety of life. When claims or methods aim
at a high generality, they must appeal to common features of living things, and these
are few and often abstract. For example, population genetics achieves high
generality, since importantly similar processes of genome replication characterize
all animals, plants, fungi, protists, bacteria, archaea and viruses. But people
interested in these organisms may not be interested in changes in allele frequencies
(see Lynch 2007, Ch. 13).
A more widely appreciated feature of evolution is the appearance and spread of
conspicuous novelties, ‘‘like nothing the world has ever seen before’’ (Wagner
2015; see also Mayr 1960; Laubichler 2009; Wagner 2014). There are time-
honoured ways of studying individual novelties, using various forms of ‘‘lineage
explanation’’ (Mayr 1960; Calcott 2009). But a collection of detailed reconstruc-
tions is not a theory; and it is not a surprise, or a criticism, that the most interesting
and ambitious theories of evolutionary novelty, are both restricted in scope
(applying, for example, to a small subset of traits in a minority of organisms: the
5 This is clearest when we ask why something didn’t happen in a particular lineage: Why are there so few
truly marine insects? Why aren’t there penguins in the arctic? Why don’t pigs have wings?
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multicellular eukaryotes), and make their general claims at quite a high level of
abstraction (e.g. Wagner 2014, 2015).
Of course evolutionary biology does have a very general and powerful idea. But
the theory of natural selection causes additional problems. One problem is its
deceptive simplicity (Huxley 1887, p. 197); it is an idea that we all think we
understand, but which continues to divide experts (e.g. Lewens 2010; Pence and
Ramsey 2013). The simplicity is deceptive in a second sense: our intuitions about
natural selection are often very poor. For example, nature is full of ‘‘traits whose
complexity makes it difficult to see how they can be accounted for by normal
natural selection’’ (Papineau 2005), and so it is tempting to assume that some factor,
neglected by current evolutionary thinking, must also have played a ‘‘creative role’’.
This argument from our ignorance stems from Mivart (1871, e.g. Chs. 2 and 4), but
it is not restricted to creationists (e.g. Waddington 1960, Ch. 9; Papineau 2005;
Nagel 2012; see also Orr 2013).
Finally, something about our attitude to the past, and to the natural world (Plumb
1969; Thomas 1983), makes us demand from evolutionary biology some special
kinds of impact (Maynard Smith 1988). These demands are sometimes fairly
concrete, e.g. for biological facts to underpin moral theories (Waddington 1960;
Rosenberg 1990; MacIntyre 1999; Wilson 2009), but are often much vaguer
demands to help us feel ‘‘at home in the universe’’, or provide us with moral uplift
(Waddington 1960, Ch. 9; Saunders 1994, 2003; Kauffman 1995; Jacquet 2005).
For authors who make such demands, natural selection causes problems, not only
because it is mindless and amoral, but because it can seem downright immoral. For
example, Saunders (2003) writes ‘‘there is a further danger, as well. Darwinist
explanations inherently invoke selfishness and greed as the most important driving
forces’’. This isn’t true, and even Darwin’s own emphasis on ‘‘struggle’’ probably
rests on a mistake (Lewens 2010), but there is a very weak sense in which natural
selection involves competition, and there is a lot of research on ‘‘conflicts’’.6
The study of adaptive function
The problems discussed above have no common thread, and they apply widely in
evolutionary biology. However, they coalesce in a special way for one research
programme: the study of adaptive function. The goal of such research is not a
precise description of evolutionary change. Instead, it aims for a strong account of
phenotypic function, which is linked to a partial account of why those phenotypes
6 Evolutionary conflicts can arise when interacting biological agents are of different types (i.e. symbionts
and hosts, males and females, parents and offspring, nuclear- and mitochondrially-encoded genes, etc.),
although in all cases, the outcome might also be mutualism. It can seem as if an adolescent wish to
shock—or worse—motivates the focus on nature’s horrors (Kaplan 2009), but this is a canard. Conflicts
are of special interest for three prosaic reasons: they are more likely than mutualisms to lead to ongoing
evolution; they play an important role in disease (Stearns and Koella 2009); and the widespread
assumption of shared interests has led to several scientific errors (Williams 1966).
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exist.7 Research of this kind is found across biology, because traits of all kinds
might be adaptations (Maynard Smith 1978; Mayr 1983), but it has attracted most
attention in behavioural ecology (Tinbergen 1963; Grafen 1991, 2007; Cuthill
2009).
Such research uses ideas related to optimization, including tools from engineer-
ing and economics, and often represents evolution in terms of (imaginary) agents
with (imaginary) agendas. To see why this might be useful, consider leaf insects of
the genus Phyllium, and butterflies of the genus Anteos. These genera both contain
leaf mimics, which look quite similar, and probably do so for similar reasons. These
reasons are adaptive rationales, and they do not imply any similarity in the
ontogenies of the genera, and nor in the details of their evolutionary histories
(Dennett 1995, p. 21; Papineau 2010). Nevertheless, hypotheses about these reasons
can be tested (e.g. from morphology alone, we might predict that certain resting
sites will be favoured in a controlled choice experiment; and we might predict that
both genera live in habitats that contain similar looking leaves, and visually-guided
predators that might dine happily on insects, but not on leaves). Identifying
‘‘agendas’’ is necessary if we want to distinguish the proper function of the mimicry
(camouflage from predators), from accidental byproducts (attracting wildlife
photographers) and from malfunctions (attracting herbivores). Identifying ‘‘agents’’
is useful for predicting which parts of the world will act as if in accordance with the
agenda. For example, leaves play a crucial role in explaining the presence of leaf
mimics, but they are not usefully considered as agents in this case (e.g. we would
not expect leaves to evolve leg-like structures to more closely resemble their
mimics, nor to direct their growth towards them).8
Hypothesizing about adaptive rationales is easy to do badly, and difficult to do
well. Furthermore, research tends to focus on cases that require some ingenuity (no
Crafoord prizes for explaining why leaf insects look like leaves). Nevertheless, a
central goal of the study of adaptation has been to rein in functional ascription,
restricting its use to cases where it does real explanatory or predictive work
(Williams 1966). So while the historical processes that have resulted in adaptations
are remarkably diverse, research on adaptive function focuses on a single
component of the total change—the optimizing tendency that results from, and is
sometimes defined as the action of natural selection (Maynard Smith 1978; Grafen
1991, 1999, 2007; Gardner et al. 2011). This is the part of the dynamics that makes
it useful to talk about functions. Similarly, the adaptations themselves are
remarkably diverse, but the list of agents and agendas is very limited. In most
cases, the agents are organisms, and their agenda is to increase their inclusive fitness
7 I am bracketing several debates here, whose importance for scientific practice can be exaggerated. In
short, functional ascription can be indeterminate and change over time, while the presence of a trait can
be explained in several different ways, all of which will be incomplete (see, e.g., Tinbergen 1963; Mayr
1997; Cuthill 2009; Perlman 2009). The research described is connected, but not equivalent, to any of
Lewens’ (2009) ‘‘seven types of adaptationism’’.
8 For some purposes, it may be possible to avoid intentional language altogether (Godfrey-Smith 2011),
but it is both useful, and necessary if we want to explain why organisms look as if they were designed
(since apparent design implies imaginary agency). This argues, against Cummins and Roth (2009), that
‘‘accounting for some (suspect) intuitions’’ is a legitimate goal of the theory.
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(Hamilton 1964a, b)—although as Dawkins (1976, 1982) argued, more-or-less the
same idea can be recast with genes as the agents, and gene survival as the agenda.9
This list of agents should not include everything that influences the evolutionary
process (no nests, social groups, epigenetic marks or ecosystems), and the agendas
should not include everything that organisms do (Tinbergen 1963; Williams 1966;
cf. Eldredge 1995, p. 39–40, and Cummins and Roth 2009).
Of course, the theoretical machinery is only needed to understand difficult cases,
and in practice, there is a lot of leeway. For example, measures of performance
(such as foraging success or steadiness of gait) are often used as proxies for
inclusive fitness (Arnold 1983), and the mode of inheritance is often ignored, by
focusing solely on the phenotypes (Grafen 1991). Nevertheless, this research
programme rejects claims that water can cause adaptations (Gould and Lewontin
1979), or that ecosystems have functions, in the same sense as do, e.g. eyes
(Williams 1966; Dawkins 1982, Ch. 13; Jax 2005; Okasha and Paternotte 2012).
Adaptations distinguish living things from other complex dynamical systems,
such as piles of sand, or the weather. Nevertheless, it is clear that methods designed
for studying adaptive function won’t be of much use for many evolutionary
biologists—including those with other sorts of question about adaptations (e.g.
Tinbergen 1963; Coyne et al. 1997). Other biologists might want to understand
macroecological patterns (such as the latitudinal species gradient), obtain a more
detailed description of the evolutionary history of one particular lineage or trait (e.g.
the evolution of feathers, or vestigial eyes), investigate the evolution of apparently
maladaptive phenotypes (such as reproductive isolation, or senescence), or selective
processes that are unlikely to lead to adaptations (e.g. non-transmissible cancers, or
between-clade differences in speciation rates), investigate the evolution of the many
‘‘second-order’’ properties that might influence a population’s future evolution,10 or
simply quantify the action of natural selection (Maynard Smith and Haigh 1974;
Lande and Arnold 1983; Goodnight et al. 1992).
This ‘‘non-adaptationist’’ research includes most work in evolutionary biology,
including almost all of population genetics. Here, the aim is to describe a dynamical
process—allele frequency change—and this implies a stronger focus on genetic drift
(Wright 1967; Kimura 1983), and a different picture of natural selection. For
population geneticists, natural selection is a quantifiable bias in the transmission of
9 The ‘‘agent’’ has several distinct roles in Dawkins’ framework, some of which have no analogue in the
organism-as-agent approach, and none of which imply selfishness in any strict sense (Dawkins
1982, 2004; Lloyd 2001; Gardner and Welch 2011; Haig 2012; Bourke 2014). Dawkins’ recasting, of
course, motivates the common claim that theories of adaptive function are ‘‘reductionist’’. This is difficult
to take seriously; the research involves imaginary agents.
10 These topics all relate to what Richard Dawkins dubbed ‘‘evolvability’’, and include the evolution of
mutation rates (Lynch 2010), recombination rates (Barton 1995), environmental variance (Hill and
Mulder 2010), pleiotropy (Wagner and Altenberg 1996), mating systems etc. Such properties of the
genetic system can all evolve under the action of natural selection, but are not easily studied with
optimization-based approaches (e.g. Grafen 2007). Indeed, this is the area of evolutionary biology where
unsupported claims about adaptive function are most common (Lynch 2007, Ch. 13), with failures to
distinguish between simple descriptions (‘introns are sometimes involved in the adaptive evolution of
gene regulation’) and much stronger statements (‘introns evolved to facilitate adaptive changes in gene
regulation’).
What’s wrong with evolutionary biology?
123
alleles between generations. This involves no imaginary agency, and might not lead
to anything being optimized. Indeed, it is easy to write down simple models that
appear to act as counterexamples to any proposed maximand (Felsenstein 2000).
This seems paradoxical, because population genetics is often said to underpin
research on biological adaptation—and it does (e.g. Wright 1967, pp 254–255). But
the underpinning is subtle (e.g. Maynard Smith 1978; Charlesworth 1990; Eshel
1996; Hammerstein 1996; Grafen 2007; Rousset 2015; Lehmann et al. 2015), full of
caveats (as it must be in a world full of maladaptation), and also, in certain ways,
contingent: other dynamical processes could do a similar job (Dawkins 2004;
Gardner 2011; Godfrey-Smith 2011). The relationship is close for empirical
reasons: there just aren’t many (or any?) examples of engineering or agency-type
thinking doing useful work in biology, without natural selection acting on genomic
variation having played a role. So the two research programmes are closely
connected, and they often interact in fruitful ways (e.g. Hinde et al. 2010; Barrett
and Hoekstra 2011), but their goals, and pictures of natural selection, remain
distinct.
Critics of research on adaptive function
Several different critiques of evolutionary biology make more sense if understood,
at least in part, as failures to appreciate the distinctive goals of research on adaptive
function.11 For example, there has been a recent call to abandon the most successful
addition to evolutionary biology in the last few decades: W. D. Hamilton’s inclusive
fitness theory (IFT), sometimes called ‘‘kin selection’’12 (Hamilton 1964a, b). These
critics (Nowak et al. 2010; Allen et al. 2013) have argued that:
(i) IFT often gives a description of allele frequency change that is inadequate
and/or inaccurate, particularly when there are ‘‘complex interactions’’.
(ii) IFT has made few predictions that are truly quantitative.
(iii) IFT is never necessary, because it is always possible to give a complete
description of allele frequency change that makes no mention of IFT.
The critics conclude that IFT should be abandoned, in favour of ‘‘standard natural
selection theory’’. Defenders of IFT (e.g. Gardner et al. 2011; Gardner and West
2014; Rousset 2015) have replied that:
11 The failure of understanding is clearest in claims that the research programme is empty: that by
manipulating the Price equation (a mathematical identity), and relegating factors to the transmission term,
researchers make claims that are unfalsifiable (Pigliucci 2007; Cummins and Roth 2009; Allen et al.
2013). This echoes the old criticism that natural selection is a tautology (Maynard Smith 1969), and takes
no account of how predictive theories of adaptation are actually used.
12 My account of this debate is simplified, and I ignore criticisms that do not put the opposing case at its
strongest. For example, Allen et al. (2013) make the potentially important criticism that IFT confuses
correlation and causation, but the validity of their claim will not be possible to judge until they
incorporate the necessary class structure into their IFT analyses.
J. J. Welch
123
(iv) IFT is a predictive theory of adaptation, which is successful because it
focusses on a single component of the evolutionary change: the optimizing
tendency that characterizes a very broad class of evolutionary histories.
(v) IFT has explained a very large number of biological adaptations that had
proven puzzling (e.g. adaptations involving suicidal self-sacrifice).
(vi) Beyond this basic insight, IFT has been a remarkably productive research
programme, with a large number of testable, and tested predictions.
Notice that one could agree with all six claims, and diagnose only a difference in
research goals.
Arguments very similar to (i)–(iii) have also appeared in other contexts.13 While
the details differ, the common claim is that research in evolutionary biology
oversimplifies the process of evolution, by placing too much emphasis on a limited
range of factors (natural selection, unlinked genes, additive effects etc.).
These arguments are familiar, in part, because they are made by two quite
different groups of critics. First, there are researchers who are interested in
describing evolution, but not very interested in adaptive function. To these
researchers, a lot of valid research in evolutionary biology can seem sloppy,
inappropriately anthropomorphic, or willfully ignorant of evolution’s complexities.
In this case, arguments similar to (iv)–(vi) can be an appropriate response: for
researching biological function/malfunction and adaptive rationales, it can be useful
or necessary to focus exclusively on natural selection conceived as an optimizing
tendency, and on a limited range of agents and agendas (Mayr 1983; Gardner 2013).
By contrast, the second group of critics dislike standard theories of adaptive
function, and wish to see them undermined. The reasons for this dislike are not
always scientific, but involve anxieties about agency and overall purpose, which the
theories seem to raise (e.g. Waddington 1960, Chs. 6 and 9; Francis 2004; Church
2007).14 The anxieties are easy enough to understand. While naturalistic, the
theories superficially resemble a transcendental account of value (they provide
criteria for judging behaviours as better or worse, without reference to anybody’s
attitudes),15 but the values that they superficially endorse are unattractive (the
imaginary motives of the imaginary agents are generally base), and in some
13 For example, (i) and (ii) echo Mayr’s (1959) attack on ‘‘bean-bag genetics’’ (which itself echoes
Waddington 1957, pp. 59–60), and which Mayr (1983) connects to part of Gould and Lewontin’s (1979)
attack on ‘‘adaptationism’’. Saunders (1994), echoes (iii) when he argues that ‘‘there seems no particular
reason to invoke natural selection‘‘ to describe his model, while Wood and Coe (2007) show that there are
good reasons.
14 Waddington (1960) disliked theories where ‘‘mutation appears as an external force, to which the
organism passively submits’’ (p. 88), or where evolution ‘‘just happened to go the way it did, but for no
ascertainable reason’’ (p. 89). Rose (2016a, b) summarizes his own ‘‘main argument’’ thus: ‘‘redefining
evolution as ‘a change of gene frequency in a population’ is a reductionism too far, depriving living
organisms of playing any part in their own destiny’’.
15 This relates to a more serious question: whether standard accounts of adaptive function undermine all
realist theories of value (Street 2006). Realist theories have been defended by appealing to niche
construction (Rouse 2015), or to group selection (Okrent 2016), or to something as yet unknown to
science (Nagel 2012). Waddington, also concerned with this issue (1960, pp. 98–100), made a case for all
three processes, and for genetic assimilation, although his arguments are embryonic (see Chs. 6 and 9).
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accounts, the imaginary agents are not even humans. Anxieties can be real, even if
they are baseless, and the aims of these critics are best viewed as therapeutic.
To this end, theories of adaptive function can be undermined in any number of
ways. A common strategy is to diffuse the imaginary agency more liberally around
the system: first, by emphasizing any of the factors that the theories neglect
(ignoring the principled reasons for their neglect), and then, by (re)describing the
factors using the language of agency (e.g. ‘‘natural genetic engineering’’, ‘‘directed
mutation’’, ‘‘self-organisation’’, ‘‘Gaia’’, ‘‘niche construction’’), or terms with strong
connotations of agency (such as ‘‘non-random’’ or ‘‘plasticity’’; Woodfield 1976,
Ch. 3). The result need not be a genuine alternative theory of function (i.e. an
account that might be used to predict or explain anything).16 As long as the
description of evolution ‘‘seems easier to bring into relation with our moral
feelings’’ (Waddington 1960, p. 100), it might help us to behave or feel better. If the
imaginary agency is sufficiently diffuse, dynamical systems theory can become a
sort of mysticism (e.g. Bateson 1958; Waddington 1960, pp. 98–100; Saunders
1994; Goodwin 2001, Ch. 7; Capra and Luisi 2014).
If both groups of critics misunderstand the study of adaptive function, they do so
in radically different ways, and with radically different motivations. Nevertheless,
neither group writes in isolation, and each can influence, and be influenced by the
other (Laland et al. 2011): the first group becoming convinced that their descriptions
of dynamical processes are challenging to orthodoxy, and relevant to Big Questions,
and the second group becoming convinced that their nagging doubts about ‘‘Neo-
Darwinism’’ have a firm empirical or mathematical basis. In this way, the conviction
that laundry list topics are ‘‘important’’ can simply emerge, without anybody being
able to explain why.17
16 The major exception is ‘‘old group selection’’, with its claim that adaptations often function for the
good of the group (Williams 1966; West et al. 2007; Okasha and Paternotte 2012; Bourke 2014; see also
Waddington 1960, Ch. 6).
17 There is ambiguity even in the most serious and substantial arguments. For example, Laland and
Sterelny (2006) argue that existing research on extended phenotypes, and other types of organism-
induced environmental change, should be renamed as ’’niche construction‘‘, so that the work can be
recognised as ‘‘part of a new and valuable general framework’’. This is, at least in effect, a request to shift
emphasis away from the study of adaptive function, and towards more detailed dynamical descriptions of
particular lineages (see also Laland et al. 2011; Gardner 2013), but there are also phrases that read like
emotive requests to diffuse the agency. For example, the authors express regret that ‘‘the active agency of
beavers […] acting as codirectors of their own evolution […] currently goes unrecognized’’, but do not
show how attributing imaginary agency in a new way might lead to novel predictions. They state that the
standard approach ’’misses part of the causal story‘‘ (which is true of all possible approaches), but identify
no scientific errors that have resulted from the approach, and rely on unsupported claims about what
‘‘most biologists simply assume’’. None of this would have mattered to Waddington (1960), who had non-
scientific reasons for elevating the beaver to codirector, and focusing on cybernetic feedbacks (Chs. 6 and
9).
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Discussion
Claims that evolutionary biology is flawed or importantly incomplete are as old as
the field. The criticisms are characterized by their diversity at any given time (as
seen in the laundry lists of ideas and observations that are championed by critics; Ho
and Saunders 1984; Pigliucci and Mu¨ller 2010; Chorost 2013; Rose 2016a), and by
their persistence over time (West-Eberhard 2009); there are very strong similarities
between the arguments of, say, mid-twentieth century critics (e.g. Waddington
1957, 1960; Bateson 1958), and critics writing over 50 years earlier (e.g. Mivart
1871; Mozley 1884, pp. 396–7), or 50 years later (e.g. Laland et al. 2011, 2014;
Teresi 2011; Rose 2016a, b).
This does not mean that the critics are wrong. Both the diversity and persistence
of criticism might be explained by intransigence and lack of ambition in the field, by
‘‘the intolerance and narrow-mindedness of some of those who advocate [Darwin-
ism]’’ (Mivart 1871), particularly in its ‘‘orthodox’’, ‘‘ultra’’ or ‘‘hardline’’ forms
(Teresi 2011; Rose 2016a).18 However, this explanation is not very plausible.
Critics and ‘‘novel’’ findings of all kinds have never lacked attention in evolutionary
biology, and this sprawling field could have no means of enforcing conformity to
any of its tenets,19 even if it could agree on what they were.
It has been argued here that the discontent is better understood as stemming from
a few inescapable properties of living things, which lead to disappointment with
evolutionary biology, and a nagging feeling that reform must be overdue. It has been
further argued that particular discontent stems from misunderstandings and dislike
of one well-known subfield: the study of adaptive function, in the tradition of
behavioural ecology (Tinbergen 1963; Cuthill 2009). One of the few things shared
by the laundry list items is their minor role in theories of adaptive function.
Therefore, all can be championed as alternatives to such research (things we that we
might, or should, study instead), or as observations that promise to invalidate these
theories (because they affect outcomes in the world, but are not centre stage in the
theories). This subfield is a particular target because it is atypical (most researchers
do not share its goals), because it requires a very partial description of evolution (as
something like inclusive fitness maximization), and because it uses ideas of
apparent purpose and imaginary agency, but in a limited way (to make
testable predictions, and not to inspire or dignify).
For all of these reasons, the special criticism directed at the subfield is not
surprising, but it is a pity. With its inherent focus on plastic phenotypes (Grafen
1999), and whole organisms (Grafen 2007), its common focus on sociality and
cooperation (West et al. 2007), deep roots in ecology (Cuthill 2009), strong ties to
developmental biology (Hogan and Bolhuis 2009), agnosticism about the details of
inheritance (Grafen 1991; Gardner 2011), and above all, its remarkably productive
synthesis of modelling, field observation and experiment, behavioural ecology
18 Others have argued that biologists must suffer from ‘‘cyclic amnesia’’ (West-Eberhard 2009), or a
failure to understand causation (Waddington 1960, Ch. 9; Laland et al. 2011).
19 For a remarkable, but atypical attempt, see (The Editors 2016).
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seems like the sort of science that many critics of evolutionary biology might
otherwise embrace.
If the account above can explain some puzzling things, it also has obvious
weaknesses. First—and as ever in biology—an attempt to explain a pattern is not to
deny the exceptions. This article makes no serious attempt to rebut any single
criticism of evolutionary biology, and no attempt at all to restrict what is studied.
What has been argued is that there can be smoke without fire—that persistent and
voluble criticism of evolutionary biology is to be expected, whether or not anything
is seriously wrong.
Second, the above account involves some speculation about extra-scientific
motives, and this is always foolhardy and offensive. But it may be unavoidable. We
do need to explain why ideas are so often hailed as important before they have done
much scientific work, and why claims that seem utterly banal (‘things are more
complicated’, ‘natural selection doesn’t explain everything’, ‘individuals with the
same genotype can have different phenotypes’), might be treated as momentous,
vital or urgent. It is also undeniable that a lot of writing about evolutionary biology
has its mind on higher things (the same, shopworn collection of topics, from Marx
and Spencer, to markets and trolley problems). Evolutionary biology, like history,
but unlike other natural sciences, raises issues of purpose and agency, alongside
those of complexity and generality (Anonymous 1953; Mount 2016), and so there
will always be those who agree with Carr (1964) that methods and explanatory goals
cannot and should not be separated from political or religious agendas (Maynard
Smith 1998, Ch. 5; Rose 2016a). Some may even agree with Bateson (1958), that
Waddington’s work on genetic assimilation (showing that environmentally-induced
traits can become less sensitive to environmental conditions following allele
frequency change) really does have implications for ‘‘the battle between non-moral
materialism and the more mystical view of the universe’’.20 It is remarkable, for
example, that much of the funding for challenging current practice in evolutionary
biology comes from The John Templeton Foundation (Pennisi 2016), which is
committed to using science to reveal underlying purpose, and rejecting what Nagel
(2012) calls ‘‘the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature’’. But perhaps
this is just history repeating itself as farce: if poetry couldn’t save us, nothing on the
laundry lists will either.
If criticism of evolutionary biology is inevitable, why grouse about it? It is easy
to habituate to misleading alarm calls (Cheney and Seyfarth 1988), and churlish to
complain about peripheral ideas, which, by definition, have little influence on what
most scientists do. However, claims that evolutionary biology is misguided or
importantly incomplete are not harmless, but actively hinder progress in the field.
Indeed, they do so in several ways. First, the claims misrepresent the field to the
wider public. It is unfair to use guilt by association—many fine studies are cited on
creationist websites—but a field that urgently needs reform is a field ‘‘in crisis’’
(Mazur 2010), and when it fails to reform, this lends credibility to claims that
20 The fact that the laundry list items play little role in theories of adaptive function is another way of
saying that they cannot explain apparent design. This may explain why so many appear in natural
theology (e.g. Bateson 1958; Bowler 1989, e.g., p. 259; Crawford 2005).
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scientists are, at best, hidebound and foolish, and at worst, guilty of ideologically-
motivated deception (Mazur 2010; Teresi 2011). Such claims find an eager audience
among those who reject the scientific consensus on other grounds. For example,
Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini (2010) present a priori objections to (their version of)
natural selection, but also include a fairly typical laundry list to add some empirical
heft. Chorost (2013) criticized Nagel (2012) for not including a laundry list. Second,
and within the field, the claims encourage neophilia. This makes us unwilling to
build on previous work, to integrate new findings and ideas with existing
explanatory frameworks, to replicate published results (Nakagawa and Parker
2015), or to solve the field’s many outstanding problems (Maynard Smith 1977;
John 1981). It also distracts attention from the ways in which all biologists can do
something genuinely new, such as expanding the range of study organisms. The
comparative method (Maynard Smith and Halliday 1979), Krogh’s principle (Krebs
1975), and our ignorance of biodiversity (Nee 2004), all suggest that this is one way
that we might usefully extend the field.
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